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How Practical Know-how Contextualizes Theoretical Knowledge:  
Exporting Causal Knowledge From Laboratory to Nature 
1. Introduction. 
 Thomas H. Morgan’s theory of transmission genetics, like many scientific 
theories, was created in concert with the construction of an experimental system. 
Morgan’s system was based on a species of fruit fly, Drosophila melanogaster. But 
experiments were not conducted on ordinary Drosophila flies. As Robert Kohler’s 
history of Drosophila genetics shows, the fly was reconstructed to serve the 
purposes of Morgan and his colleagues (1994). Although Kohler focuses on what 
he calls “the moral economy” of the laboratory and ignores geneticists’ theoretical 
work, his account suggests that the fly was reconstructed to exhibit inheritance 
patterns that could be explained with a relatively simple theory. And indeed, this 
was the case. The inheritance patterns explained by the transmission theory were 
not inheritance patterns exhibited by wild flies; rather, they were patterns 
generated by systematically changing the inner-composition of flies. The 
construction of the transmission theory of classical genetics went hand-in-hand 
with the reconstruction of the fly.  
 Using the transmission theory to account for the inheritance behavior of 
flies that were reconstructed so that their behavior would fit the theory is circular. 
But, it is not viciously circular with respect to explaining the inheritance behavior 
of the reconstructed flies. The theory truly accounted for inheritance patterns 
generated in the laboratory. But the fact that the theory accounted for these 
artificial patterns does not by itself imply that it also represented inheritance 
patterns in nature. And this raises an important epistemological question: what 
kind(s) of knowledge, if any, indicated the theory’s relevance to inheritance in 
wild flies outside highly-controlled settings? The aim of this paper is to answer 
this question.1 
2. Received Model of Exportation of Laboratory Knowledge. 
 One answer to our question about the exportation of knowledge from 
laboratory to nature might be called the “received model” because it relates to 
what has been called the received view of scientific theories. According to the 
latter view, scientific theories consist of universal, law-like statements and bridge 
                                                
1 The issue I’m addressing is related to issues addressed in the scientific, philosophical, and 
historical literature on model organisms (see Ankeny 2001, Bolker 1995 and Bolker and Raff 1997, 
Fields and Johnston 2005, Rader 2004, and Schaffner 1998). But the literature on model 
organisms places more emphasis on the exportation of knowledge from a few species to many 
species whereas I am more interested in the exportation of knowledge from the laboratory to 
nature. My interests and ideas are more closely related to Cartwright’s work in the philosophy of 
physics (1999 and Cartwright, Shomar, and Suarez 1995).  
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principles. On this view, the exportation of theoretical knowledge from laboratory 
to nature is unproblematic because the knowledge gained in the laboratory is 
universal. The laws must apply to wild flies as well as reconstructed ones. This 
view does not deny the existence of practical difficulties involved with applying 
theories to concrete situations inside and outside the laborator The issue I’m 
addressing is related to issues addressed in the scientific, philosophical, and 
historical literature on model organisms (see Ankeny 2001, Bolker 1995 and 
Bolker and Raff 1997, Fields and Johnston 2005, Rader 2004, and Schaffner 
1998). But the literature on model organisms places more emphasis on the 
exportation of knowledge from a few species to many species whereas I am more 
interested in the exportation of knowledge from the laboratory to nature. My 
interests and ideas are more closely related to Cartwright’s work in the philosophy 
of physics (1999 and Cartwright, Shomar, and Suarez 1995). y. Such applications 
entail filling in the initial conditions, and the complications exhibited in nature 
may pose severe practical limitations. Hence, in practice, it might be difficult to 
apply a theory to individual cases in nature. Nevertheless, in principle, if a theory 
truly accounts for the laboratory phenomenon by identifying the underlying 
universal laws responsible for the laboratory phenomena, then it must represent 
the phenomena in nature as well. 
 According to this traditional model of exportation, scientists reconstruct 
flies in ways that reveal universal laws about the inheritance behavior of flies, 
which because they are universal, apply to wild flies as well. The difficulties in 
exportation are merely pragmatic. The received model might be summarized as 
follows: 
study of artificial cases  ⇒  universal laws ⇒  universal exportation 
The problem with this model is that it depends on the idea that experimentation 
uncovers universal laws, but the principles that Morgan and his colleagues 
identified were not universal, at least not in the sense necessary for the received 
model of exportation.  
3. The Central Principles of the Transmission Theory. 
 Classical geneticists, starting with Morgan and his collaborators, explained 
the transmission of phenotypic differences by following the transmission of gene 
differences from generation to generation and attributing the presence of 
alternative phenotypic traits to the presence of alternative forms of genes. Their 
theoretical explanations depended on the idea that genes are located in linear 
fashion on chromosomes, on principles about the transmission of genes that were 
grounded in an understanding of cytological processes such as meiosis, and on 
the principle that differences in genes cause differences in phenotypes. I will 
illustrate the problem with the received model by examining two of its key 
principles: the crossover principle and the difference principle. 
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 Crossing over occurs during meiosis, the process in which a diploid cell 
divides to produce haploid gametes. During this process, homologous 
chromosomes are aligned with one another and pulled apart. When they are 
aligned, they sometimes break and reconnect to the corresponding part of the 
homologous chromosome. This is called crossing over. Two genes located on a 
single chromosome, say the maternally derived chromosome, can be separated, if 
a single crossover event occurs between them. For instance, consider the 
recombination two genes located on the same chromosome, each of which has 
two different allelic forms. Call the allelic forms of the first gene, A and a, and of 
the second gene, B and b. Suppose a maternally derived chromosome contains an 
A allele at one locus and a B allele at another locus (is “AB”). Suppose the 
paternally derived homologous chromosome contains a at the first locus and b at 
the second (is “ab”). A single crossover event between these loci would result in 
Ab and aB chromosomes. What I call the crossover principle can be stated as follows:  
crossover events between genes on homologous chromosomes occur regularly and at 
rates is proportional to the distance separating the genes 
This principle applies only to female Drosophila because crossing over does not 
occur in male flies. The regularity of crossover rates led to regularities in the 
recombination of genes during sexual reproduction, which resulted in observed 
regularities in the recombination of traits that appear together in the individual 
parents. Applying the crossover principle enabled geneticists to explain statistical 
patterns of inheritance and to determine where genes were located on 
chromosomes. This principle was absolutely critical to the practice of classical 
genetics. 
 The difference principle was just as important. It is what enabled geneticists 
to draw a connection between the genetic make-up of an individual and its 
outward phenotypic appearance. It associated the difference between two 
alternative alleles of a gene with alternative phenotypes: 
differences in a gene cause uniform phenotypic differences in particular genetic and 
environmental contexts  
Classical geneticists explained the transmission of characteristics from one 
generation to another in two stages. First they explained the transmission of genes 
from parents to offspring by drawing upon information about the location of 
genes and cytological principles such as the crossover principle. In the second 
stage, they drew upon information gained in the first stage about the genetic 
make-up of progeny and upon instantiations of the difference principle to explain 
the appearances of offspring.  
 The literature in philosophy of biology articulates a number of reasons for 
doubting that principles such as the crossover principle and difference principle 
represent universal laws (e.g. such as Beatty 1981 and Kitcher 1984). I won’t 
repeat them here. It is time to move on, to develop an alternative interpretation of 
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these principles, an interpretation that does not presuppose the ideal of 
universality. To do so, I will draw upon James Woodward’s manipulability 
account of causal generalizations in science (2003).  
4. Woodward’s Manipulability Account of Causal 
Generalizations. 
 According to manipulability theories, causes can be understood as 
“handles” for bringing about effects in the sense that causes can be manipulated 
to bring about different outcomes. By manipulating a causal property, one can 
change an effect property. Woodward (2003) conceives of causal relationships as 
relationships between variables, so he would express this idea by saying that the 
value of the effect variable, Y, can be changed by manipulating the value of a 
causal variable, X. Roughly speaking, Woodward says a causal relationship exists 
between two variables, X and Y, when: 
for at least some individuals there is a possible manipulation of some value of X 
that they possess which, given other appropriate conditions (perhaps including 
manipulations that fix other variables distinct from X at certain values), will 
change the value of Y or the probability distribution of Y for those individuals. 
(Woodward 2003, 40) 
Woodward’s theory, as the inclusion of the causal term ‘change’ in the above 
passage indicates, is not reductive. It does not account for cause is in non-causal 
terms. It is a non-reductive, counterfactual theory, potentially consistent with 
different reductive theories, including counterfactual theories such as the one 
proposed by David Lewis (1973).  
 On Woodward’s account, causal relationships are not necessarily 
universal. X can cause Y even if intervening on the value of X within many ranges 
of the variables X and Y would not change the value of Y. For example, there is a 
causal relationship between temperature and the phase state of water even though 
increasing the temperature of water from 20° C to 95° C will not change its phase 
state. In addition, X can cause Y even if intervening on the value of X has no 
effect on the value of Y when the value of certain variables not identified in the 
expression ‘X causes Y’ is outside some range. For example, the claim that raising 
the temperature of water from 20° C to 100° C causes water to boil is not 
contradicted by the fact that increasing the temperature of water from 20° C to 
100° C will not change the phase state of water when the atmospheric pressure is 
significantly greater than standard atmospheric pressure.  
 Woodward says that scientists identify genuine causal relationships even 
though these relationships (for example, the ones specified in textbooks) are 
almost always “sensitive” to the values of variables that figure into the specified 
relationships and/or to the values of variables that do not figure into the specified 
relationships. According to his account, the expression ‘X causes Y’ just means 
there are at least two different values of X, x1 and x2, and at least one set of values 
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for the variables specified and the variables not specified in the expression, such 
that if one intervened to change the value of variable X from x1 to x2, the value of 
Y would change. The invariance of a causal relationship concerns ranges of values 
under which the relationship holds. Since causal relationships can be sensitive to 
the values of many different variables, and since the sensitivity with respect to one 
variable can depend on the value of other variables, the relevant ‘ranges of values’ 
refers to a space (or set of spaces) in a n-dimensional array of variables (where n is 
the number of variables to which ‘X causes Y’ is sensitive). Hence, it is more 
accurate to speak of “spaces of invariance” rather than a “range of invariance.” 
 An advantage of Woodward’s theory is that it accounts for the intuitively 
plausible idea that scientists typically explain phenomena by identifying causal 
dependencies that do not obtain under all conditions. Explaining why a flask of 
water boiled over the flame of a Bunsen burner does not depend on identifying a 
totally invariant generalization. It suffices to identify the change in water 
temperature as the cause of the change in phase state under the laboratory 
conditions.  
5. A Causal Interpretation of the Difference Principle. 
 Woodward’s theory provides a natural framework for expressing the 
causal relationships identified by classical geneticists. I will illustrate this point by 
using his framework to interpret the difference principle: 
 
differences in a gene cause uniform phenotypic differences in 




for at least some organisms, a possible manipulation of the form 
of a gene they possessed as a zygote, given other appropriate 
conditions (such as genetic background and environmental 
conditions), would change the phenotypes of those individuals 
 
This reformulation makes salient features of the causal relationship expressed by 
the difference principle that are crucial for the practice of classical genetics. 
Experimentation in this science entailed controlling the genetic background and 
environmental conditions. Drosophila geneticists bred flies to “clean up” their 
genetic backgrounds so phenotypic effects of particular mutations would not be 
masked. They also controlled environmental conditions in the laboratory. These 
efforts resulted in regular and repeatable patterns of inheritance. Woodward’s 
theory emphasizes the fact that causal relationships, such as those expressed by 
the difference principle, are not universal.  
 According to this interpretation, instantiations of the difference principle 
pertaining to the claim that a particular difference in genotype caused particular 
differences in phenotype could be used to explain transmission patterns generated 
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in the laboratory even though these relationships were highly sensitive (a fuller 
account of the causality involved here can be found in Waters, forthcoming). 
Furthermore, it shows how the explanations did not depend on specifying the 
invariance space of the causal relationships. Provided a causal relationship was 
realized in the experiment set-up, the relationship could be used to explain the 
actual results. The fact that the relationship would not have been realized had the 
genetic background been different would be irrelevant to explaining the patterns 
generated when the background was carefully controlled. Hence, specifying the 
possible, but not actualized, range of genetic backgrounds under which the 
relationship would failed to hold is not necessary. 
 This interpretation, however, implies that the received model of 
exportation does not apply to laboratory genetics because the study of flies, 
reconstructed so causal principles like the difference principle would apply, 
yielded causal principles that were invariant with respect to the reconstructed flies 
under laboratory conditions, but not necessarily invariant over the range of 
conditions found in wild flies in nature. The theoretical explanations of what 
happened in the laboratory did not contain information about the invariance 
spaces of the causal generalizations invoked in the laboratory.2 So, the questions 
is, what knowledge, if any, provided information about whether the causal 
relationships extended to flies in nature. The information, I will suggest, was in 
the procedural knowledge. 
6.  Procedural Knowledge. 
 When classical geneticists explained inheritance patterns, they contributed 
to and drew upon pools of knowledge (for a fuller account see Waters 2004). 
Some of this knowledge was theoretical in the sense that it involved identifying 
underlying causal processes and constructing abstract models or representation 
structures. But much of the knowledge was practical in nature. In this section, I 
will describe the pool of procedural knowledge. In the following section, I will 
explain why the transmission theory cannot be properly understood unless it is 
placed in the context of the larger body of knowledge that includes the practical 
knowledge discussed in this section.  
 The procedural knowledge of classical genetics took different forms. 
Much of it was unwritten and was therefore passed on directly from experimenter 
to experimenter. Many researchers visited the Morgan laboratory to gain practical 
knowledge of Drosophila genetics. But a good share of the practical knowledge was 
communicated in written form. Early technical reports published by the Carnegie 
Institution of Washington and the Drosophila Information Service were filled 
with practical information.3 On the basis of written sources, one can distinguish 
                                                
2 This resonates with a them in the literature on the semantic view of theories which distinguishes 
between theoretical models and hypotheses about how the models fit various parts of the world 
(e.g. see Giere 1988). 
3 Carnegie Institution of Washington publications numbers 237 (1916), 278 (1919), 327 (1923), 
and 421 (1931). Reports of the Drosophila Information Service were edited by Bridges and 
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three broad categories of practical knowledge in classical genetics. Undoubtedly, 
much additional detail could be added to this preliminary account. 
6.1 Special Methods of Experimentation. 
 One category of practical knowledge involved special methods of 
experimentation. For example, geneticists collected knowledge about methods for 
identifying particular genotypes. Genetic analysis included studying the course of 
an allele's phenotypic expression throughout development. Knowledge from such 
studies helped researchers determine the stage at which a particular phenotype 
could be identified most easily and the trait(s) that should be used for 
identification. But geneticists also knew special tricks for identifying obscure 
mutants. One of these was called 'intensification' (or 'enhancement). This was first 
tried on purple mutants when researchers noticed that the expression of purple 
was intensified in flies homozygous for vermilion. That is, the difference between 
the purple and not-purple individuals is greater in a stock homozygous for 
vermilion than in a stock of wild-type flies. The early experiments on purple were 
carried out among individuals homozygous for vermilion to facilitate the 
separation of purples from not-purples. This practice was suspended as 
researchers developed confidence in their ability to separate purples from not-
purples in wild-type stocks. But it continued to be important in the study of other 
genes (and continues to be used today). Intensification enabled geneticists to 
experiment on mutants that would otherwise have been too obscure for careful 
genetic analysis.  
 It is tempting to think that this category of practical knowledge had little 
connection to how geneticists understood heredity. We might conclude that it was 
important as a tool for gaining knowledge about heredity, but did not actually 
impinge on that understanding. But this kind of practical knowledge contained 
information about developmental genotypes that is obscured when one looks at 
the explanations of transmission patterns, which treated phenotypes as if they 
appeared all at once. The theoretical explanations didn’t contain information 
about developmental dimensions of phenotypic expression. The information was 
embedded within the procedural knowledge. The next example illustrates practical 
knowledge that undoubtedly influenced the way practicing geneticists interpreted 
theoretical formulations of classical genetics. 
 Classical textbooks of genetics sometimes discussed mapping procedures 
and genetic distances as if the crossover rates between any two genes was 
constant (e.g. Morgan 1926, Sturtevant and Beadle 1939). In fact, crossover rates 
were not absolute. They varied from experiment to experiment. Through careful 
                                                                                                                            
Demerec and every issue contained articles on practical methods. The demand for such 
information was so great that the 6th number was published as a special issue completely devoted 
to methods. Bridges and Brehme 1944 also provided important practical information about 
methods. Methods sections of research articles often presuppose working knowledge of the 
methods described. The description of methods in the publications cited here, however, are far 
more informative. 
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study, geneticists gained knowledge about how to obtain constant crossover rates. 
Tricks included maintaining the right temperature, testing for crossover in females 
alone, breeding females of the same age, and cleaning stocks of crossover 
modifiers. Implementing such techniques enabled geneticists to collect 
reproducible measurements of crossover rates. But these measurements, and the 
genetic maps that were based upon them, did not measure absolute rates of 
crossing over between loci or rates that would exist in wild flies in nature. What 
they measured was the relative rate of crossing over in artificially reconstructed 
flies under artificial laboratory conditions. The knowledge embedded within the 
methods and tricks of classical genetics had important implications for 
understanding how the theoretical explanations of laboratory phenomena might 
apply outside the laboratory. 
6.2  Empirical Information of Practical Importance.  
 Implementing the general investigative strategies as well as the more 
specialized methods drew upon and contributed to a pool of detailed 
information.4 An example was the empirical generalization that crossing over does 
not occur in male Drosophila. This piece of information was crucial for designing 
the most common investigative strategies (e.g. the backcross test) as well as for 
devising protocols for material production (see section 3.3). This fact becomes 
absolutely clear in Bridges and Morgan's account of the practical difficulties of 
employing the backcross test before it was known that crossing over did not 
occur in male Drosophila (1919, pp. 173-4). Yet, because this fact is crucial for its 
practical rather than theoretical import, it is not the kind of detail that would be 
mentioned in a traditional philosophical accounts of scientific knowledge. 
Classical genetics was teeming with information of practical importance. Some of 
it was general such as the lack of crossing over in male Drosophila . Some was 
specific such as the observation that the development of certain mutants require 
colder or warmer developmental conditions (Bridges and Brehme 1944, see pp. 5-
6). Such information was constantly being collected and stored, to be drawn upon 
when useful for furthering investigation or understanding. This pool of 
information provided geneticists with the context for interpreting the generality 
of their transmission theory. And because this information was vital for the 
everyday practice of genetics, it must have been especially conspicuous to 
practicing geneticists. 
6.3 Methods of Material Production and Maintenance.  
 The knowledge of classical genetics included practical information about 
how to carry out procedures designed for producing and maintaining physical or 
biological products to be utilized in subsequent experiments. This knowledge was 
essential for practicing genetics. Some of this know-how admittedly involved 
                                                
4 See Waters 2004 for an account of the investigative strategies of classical genetics. 
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matters far removed from reasoning about heredity. It is hard to get excited about 
recipes for the production of media suitable for sustaining mutant Drosophila in 
the laboratory, but knowledge of such mundane matters was nevertheless 
important to the practice of genetics (Kohler 1994). Improved media enhanced 
the viability of marginal mutants and hence expanded the range of mutants that 
could be genetically analyzed. It also simplified experimental methods by 
eliminating the necessity of carrying out certain balancing trials. The development 
of suitable media was essential for establishing Drosophila as a super model of 
experimental organisms. 
 Not all knowledge of material production was peripheral. Much of this 
knowledge was closely connected to the way classical geneticists understood 
heredity. Even the simple method for 'cleaning' new mutant stocks, which 
involved repeatedly crossing the mutant to wild-type and selecting for the 
character of interest, was thought of in terms of the classical transmission theory. 
More closely associated with the special knowledge of genetics were the 
procedures for obtaining stocks necessary for the kinds of investigative 
experiments described in section 2. The three-point backcross test, for instance, 
required obtaining a stock of triply homozygous recessives. This was an extremely 
challenging task because of the lack of crossing over in male Drosophila. Standard 
protocols for obtaining multiple homozygous recessives, which entailed cleverly 
arranged breeding and selection regimens, formed an integral part of the 
knowledge of classical genetics. 
 The practical knowledge of classical genetics included clever tricks for 
maintaining stocks as well. For example, Muller (1918) devised a strategy for 
preserving heterozygosity in stocks. This was especially useful for retaining 
recessive lethal mutations that would disappear in regularly kept stocks because of 
selective pressure. Muller's trick was to balance two lethal mutants, at neighboring 
loci, against one another by breeding individuals with one copy of each recessive 
on different members of a pair of homologous chromosomes. The presence of a 
recessive lethal on each chromosome forces heterozygosity because only the 
heterozygotes survive. Hence, there would be no selection against the lethal 
recessive alleles. Crossovers in females could defeat the system, so Muller added a 
crossover repressor. Designing and carrying out breeding regimens for producing 
and maintaining stocks could not have been achieved in the absence of 
explanatory reasoning. But, the focus of the knowledge here was on practical 
problems of material production and maintenance, not on explanatory problems 
of accounting for the transmission of phenotypic traits.  
 The procedural knowledge described in this section were largely aimed 
towards making experiments work. That is, they were aimed towards constructing 
a system that fell within the invariance spaces of the causal principles of the 
transmission theory. Geneticists knew that the crossover principle did not apply 
generally, so they reconstructed the fly, for example by breeding out crossover 
reducers, to produce organisms that obeyed the crossover principle. In effect, 
they were resetting the value of background variables so the causal relationship 
designated by the crossover principle would hold. This would be a problem if 
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they were seeking universality in the crossover principle, but they weren’t. Their 
real aim was to investigate biological processes by manipulating them. And to do 
this, they needed to make the experiments work. My thesis is that their knowledge 
about what it took to make the experiments work provided an important source 
of information about the extent to which principles of the transmission theory 
might apply outside the laboratory.  
7. Exportation of Causal Knowledge From the Laboratory. 
 According to the received model of exportation, scientists construct 
artificial situations in the laboratory in order to reveal universal laws that apply 
everywhere, not just within the confines of the laboratory.  
study of artificial situations ⇒ universal laws ⇒ universal exportation 
The model of exportation I wish to propose differs in important ways. First of all, 
according to the account advanced here, laboratory research involves a process of 
dual construction. The fly wasn’t simply reconstructed to remove disturbing 
elements that obscured universal principles. Rather, the fly was continually being 
reconstructed to bring the experimental system within the invariance spaces of 
the causal principles of the transmission theory. The difference principle didn’t 
automatically apply to newly discovered mutants. Geneticists had to change 
genetic backgrounds so the difference principle would apply. Hence, a more 
accurate picture of the relationship between the study of artificial situations and 
the theoretical knowledge of genetics would convey an interplay between the 
construction of artificial situations and the formulation of somewhat invariant 
causal generalizations: 
 
construction of formulation of somewhat 
laboratory system  ⇔ invariant causal principles 
 
The exportation of knowledge about the somewhat invariant causal principles, 
which are exemplified in carefully constructed laboratory systems, to the world 
outside the laboratory is informed by an understanding of the interplay between 
the construction of laboratory system and the formulation of the causal 
principles:  
 
construction of  formulation of somewhat 
laboratory system  ⇔ invariant causal principles 
 
     ⇓ 
 
 exportation of knowledge outside the laboratory 
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8. Conclusion. 
 The explanatory and investigative practices of classical genetics were 
interwoven. Neither can be properly understood separately from the other. 
Explanatory reasoning depended on practical knowledge because the explanations 
appealed to causal regularities that were understood in light of knowledge about 
the procedures used to observe them. Without this practical knowledge, the scope 
of the regularities, even as applied to a single species, would have been unknown. 
Perhaps the clearest illustration of this point involves the crossover principle. 
Explanations of the recombination of phenotypic traits cited regular rates of 
crossing over (between given loci). But geneticists knew that crossover rates were 
variable. Rates were constant only when stocks were cleaned of crossover 
modifiers, bred at early ages, and maintained under appropriate laboratory 
conditions. In the absence of this practical knowledge, one might think that the 
regularities of crossing over apply to Drosophila generally when in fact they apply 
only to artificially modified flies under special conditions. This practical 
knowledge does not undermine the individual explanations of classical genetics or 
the causal regularities on which they depend. But it provides a more realistic 
understanding of them, an understanding more in keeping with the knowledge of 
practicing geneticists. 
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